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Abstract 
 
This paper argues that to talk about organisations learning is to reify and 
anthropomorphise organisations. Instead of thinking of an organisation as if it were a 
thing or a person it is closer to experience to think of an organisation as the patterning of 
peoples’ interactions with each other. This paper explores the assumptions that are being 
made when we talk about organisations or groups that learn, or about individuals learning 
in groups or organisations. It suggests an alternative to thinking in these ways, namely, 
that learning is an activity of interdependent people. If one takes the view an organisation 
is the organising activities of interdependent people, it leads to a particular perspective on 
learning. Much of the communicative and power relating activities of interdependent 
people take the form of continually iterated patterns of repetition in which meaning and 
power figurations have the quality of stability which we call identity. But because of the 
nonlinear iterative nature of human interaction there is always the potential for small 
differences to be amplified into transformative shifts in identity. Learning is then 
understood as the emerging shifts in the patterning of human communicative interaction 
and power relating. Leaning is the activity of interdependent people and can only be 
understood in terms of self organising communicative interaction and power relating in 
which identities are potentially transformed. Individuals cannot learn in isolation and 
organisations can never learn.  
 
 
Learning, organisation, complexity, process, responsive, emergence. 
 
This paper is one of a number in a special issue titled “The Implications of Complexity 
and Chaos Theories for Organizations that Learn.” That title immediately points to an 
important question, which one might pose in the following terms: Do organisations learn 
or is it individuals and groups in organisations who learn? If one thinks that it is 
individuals and groups inside an organisation that learn then one focuses attention on 
individual and collective learning processes. If it is thought that it is organisations that 
learn then attention is focused on what it is about an organisation that makes learning 
possible. 
 
A distinction along these lines is used by Easterby-Smith and Araujo (1999) to identify 
two strands in the literature to do with organisations and learning. They distinguish 
between the literature on organisational learning and that on the learning organisation. 
They say that the former “has concentrated on the detached observation and analysis of 
the processes involved in individual and collective learning inside organizations” (p2). 
The literature on the learning organisation, on the other hand, is concerned with 
“methodological tools which can help to identify, promote and evaluate the quality of 
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learning processes inside organizations” (p2) and in so doing this literature identifies 
“templates, or ideal forms, which real organizations could attempt to emulate” (p2). 
Easterby-Smith et al argue that there is a growing divide between the two strands. Those 
writing in the organisational learning tradition are interested in “understanding the nature 
and processes of learning” (p8). Those writing in the tradition of the learning organisation 
are more interested in “the development of normative models and methodologies for 
creating change in the direction of improved learning processes” (p8). 
 
Easterby-Smith et al distinguish between a technical and a social strand in the 
organisational learning literature. The technical strand takes the view that organisational 
learning is a matter of processing, interpreting and responding to quantitative and 
qualitative information, which is generally explicit and in the public domain. Key writers 
in this tradition are Argyris and Schon (1978) with their notions of single and double loop 
learning. The social strand focuses attention on how people make sense of their work 
practices (Weick, 1995). This strand utilises Polanyi’s distinction between tacit and 
explicit knowledge (Polanyi & Prosch, 1975). It focuses attention on the socially 
constructed nature of knowledge (Brown & Duguid, 1991), the political processes 
involved (Coopey, 1995), and the importance of cultural and socialisation processes 
(Lave & Wenger, 1991). The literature on the learning organisation also displays 
technical and social interests. The former tends to focus on interventions based on 
measurement and information systems, while the latter focuses on individual and group 
learning processes in a normative manner (Senge, 1991; Isaacs, 1999; Nonaka & 
Takeuchi, 1995).  
 
For me, the claim that organisations learn amounts to both reification and 
anthropomorphism. I argue that organisations are not things because no one can point to 
where an organisation is – all one can point to is the artefacts used by members of 
organisations in their work together. In our experience, the organisation qua organisation 
arises as the patterning of our interactions with each other. I also argue that we depart 
from our direct experience when we think of the organisation as organism. To sustain the 
claim that an organisation is in any sense a living organism, we would need to point to 
where this living body is. Since an organisation is neither inanimate thing nor living 
body, in anything other than rather fanciful metaphorical terms, it follows that an 
organisation can neither think nor learn. But the alternative is not all that satisfactory 
either. To claim that it is only individuals who learn is to continue with the major 
Western preoccupation with the autonomous individual and to ignore the importance of 
social processes. One might try to deal with this objection by saying that it is both 
individuals and groups who learn. But that runs into the same objection as saying that 
organisations learn. The claim that groups learn is also both reification and 
anthropomorphism. A group, like any organisation or any other social institution for that 
matter, is the patterning of peoples’ interactions with each other and patterns can neither 
think nor learn. Furthermore, to talk about individuals who learn in organisations or in 
groups is also problematic because, once again, this implies that the group and the 
organisation exist somewhere as a different “place” or “level” to people. If this were not 
so, how could people be in a group or organisation? This paper explores the assumptions 
that are being made when we talk about organisations or groups that learn, or about 
 2
individuals learning in groups or organisations. The paper will also suggest an alternative 
to thinking in these ways, namely, that learning is an activity of interdependent people. 
 
I will be distinguishing, then, between two different ways of thinking about the individual 
and the group. The first separates individuals and groups as different levels of existence. 
This splitting of individual and organisation is central to the systems thinking that 
dominates the literature on learning and organisations. This is essentially a way of 
thinking in terms of dualisms or dualities. I want to contrast this with a way of thinking in 
terms of paradox in which individual and group / organisation are aspects of the same 
processes of interaction between people (Stacey, 2001). This way of thinking is built on 
the work of G. H. Mead (1934) and Elias (1939). For Mead, mind, self and society arise 
simultaneously and for Elias, the individual is the singular and the social is the plural of 
interdependent people. There are then no separate levels, only paradoxical processes of 
individuals forming the social while at the same time being formed by it. Learning is then 
to be thought of as the activity of interdependent people. 
 
Colleagues and I (Stacey et al, 2000) have combined the work of Mead, Elias and others 
with insights from complexity theories to suggest what we have called a complex 
responsive processes theory of organisations. This paper will review how one might think 
of learning and organisations from this perspective. We have used some of the work in 
the complexity sciences as a source domain for analogies with human action, understood 
from the psychological / sociological theories of Mead and Elias. I will not be referring to 
chaos theory in this paper for the following reason. In chaos theory the term “chaos” has 
a precise mathematical meaning. It defines a particular dynamic, the strange attractor, 
which is a feature of deterministic nonlinear equation operating at certain parameter 
values. Since chaos is a property of deterministic rather than evolving relationships it 
cannot have anything to do with learning. Human action is not deterministic – it evolves.  
By definition that which is deterministic cannot learn. Chaos theory can, therefore, only 
ever be used as a loose metaphor for anything in the human domain. Some types of 
complex system simulation do, however, demonstrate the capacity to evolve and it is, 
therefore, to these that we might turn for analogies with human action.  
 
 
Dichotomies, dualisms / dualities and paradox 
 
Consider first the difference between thinking in terms of dualism / dualities as in 
systems thinking and thinking in terms of paradox as in temporal process thinking 
(Stacey, 2003). 
 
In thinking about the individual and the group / organisational / social, one immediatley 
encounters the distinction between the one and the many. One could regard this 
distinction as a dichotomy, which is a polarised opposition requiring an “either…or” 
choice. Methodological individualism chooses the “one” side of the polarity, the 
individual, and from this perspective, learning is the activity of autonomous individuals. 
Methdological collectivism chooses the “many” side of the polarity and from this 
perspective, learning is a social phenomenon. There has been a long and unresolved 
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debate between these two positions, the upshot of which is the conclusion that it is 
unsatisfactory to regard the problem of the one and the many, the individual and the 
social, as a dichotomy. 
 
Another approach, then, is to think in terms of a dualism or a duality. This mode of 
thinking has a “both…and” structure. Instead of choosing between the “one” and the 
“many”, one keeps both but locates them in different spaces or times. It is this dualistic 
apprach that dominates thinking about learning and organisations. On the one hand, the 
individual (the “one”) is thought of as an autonomous individual, where mind is “inside” 
that person. Mind is then thought of as an “internal world” consisting of representations, 
maps and models of what is “outside” the person. In other words, mind is thought of as a 
whole or system of interacting parts contained within a boundary. The actions of a person 
are selected by this system, part of which the individual is aware of (explicit) and part of 
which the individual is not aware of (tacit). On this basis, individual learning is thought 
of as changes in mental models, both tacit and explicit. A particular form of causality, 
usually not stated explicitly, is implied in this way of thinking. It is assumed that 
individual human action is caused by the objectives and plans the individual chooses on 
the basis of his or her mental model and learning is the rational action of choosing to 
change the mental model and so the action. Causality here takes a rationalist form 
(Stacey at al, 2000). 
 
When the “one” is thought of in these terms, there is no option but to think of the 
“many”, (group, organisation and society) as a system existing “outside” the individual. 
This system is then thought of as a bounded entity consisting of individuals who are its 
parts. The system is formed by the interaction of the individuals and exists at a higher 
level than the individuals, following laws of its own, which might be thought of as 
emergent properties. Process has a particular meaning here – it is the interaction of 
individuals to create an entity outside of themselves. It is then easy to think of such an 
entity as a thing, a kind of super-individual with its own mind and intentions, even a 
living entity with a life of its own. From this perspective it is not problematic to think of 
an organisation as able to learn, where learning is understood as changes in organisational 
routines and strategies. Organisational learning becomes a form of cultural development 
and the task becomes one of identiying the organisational features that enable or obstruct 
such cultural development or organisational learning. It becomes the province of leaders 
to identify the vision or mission according to which the organisation and its culture 
should develop. The powerful design the system according to which they an other 
members of the organisation should interact. The powerful are supposed to make the 
choices acording to which the organisation, an objective reality outside of them, is to 
develop. They are to enfold what is to be unfolded by the development of the 
organisation. This immediately implies a particular form of causality, which is again not 
usually made explicit. That causality is formative in the sense that it is the process of 
delopment which is formring the organisation in the sense of unfolding what is already 
enfolded into it.  
 
The difference between dichotomies and dualisms / dualities is immediately apparent. 
Unlike the thinking in dochotomies, the way of thinking outlined in the last two 
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paragraphs does not choose between idividual and social. It locates them in different 
“spaces” and then posits a connection between them. Individuals form the social system 
through their choces of its objectives and the design of interactions between individuals 
and then the social system affects the actions of those individuals who are parts of the 
organisational system. The result is a dual causality. There is both the rationalist causality 
of the choosing individuals and the formative causality of the system that they are parts 
of. Thinking in this way naturally leads people to look for the features of an organisation, 
such as teamwork, that enable or block the learning of individuals. However, while 
thinking in terms of dualisms / dualities is different to thinking in terms of dichotomies in 
the way just described, they are similar in another respect. The “either…or” thinking of 
dichotomies and the “both…and” thinking of dualisms / dualities both satisfy a precept of 
Aristotelian logic, which requires the elimination of contradictions, such as the one and 
the many, forming and being formed by at the same time, because they are a sign of 
faulty thinking. 
 
As an alternative to thinking in terms of dichotmies and in terms of dualisms / dualities, 
one could think of the problem of the one and the many as a paradox. There are a number 
of different definitions of a paradox. First, it may mean an apparent contradiction, a state 
in which two apparently conflicting elements appear to be operating at the same time. 
Paradox in this sense can be removed or resolved by choosing one element above the 
other all the time or by reframing the problem to remove the apparent contradiction. 
There is little difference between paradox in this sense and dualism  / dualities and this is 
the meaning of paradox that is usually taken up in the literature on systemic views of 
organisations. However, paradox may mean a state in which two diametrically opposing 
forces / ideas are simultaneously present, neither of which can ever be resolved or 
eliminated. There is, therefore, no possibility of a choice between the opposing poles or 
of locating them in different spheres. Instead, what is required is a different kind of logic, 
such as the dialectical logic of Hegel. In this kind of logic, the word paradox means the 
presence together at the same time of contradictory, essentially conflicting ideas, none of 
which can be eliminated or resolved. Indeed it is this conflict that gives rise to the 
transformation that is central to Hegels’ dialectical logic. A technical example of this is 
the concept of mathematical chaos. Here chaos is a dynamic, a pattern, that is stable and 
unstable at the same time. In this dynamic, stability and instability are inseparable – what 
we have is the paradox of stable instability or unstable stability. The contradiction 
between stable and unstable has not been resolved but rather transformed into a different 
dynamic in whih the meanings of stability and instability have been transformed.  The 
causality implied in this kind of dialectical logic is transformative. However, this is only 
a rather dry technical example of the dialectical logic. Essential to Hegel’s dialectical 
logic is its social dimension. 
 
Hegel held that one cannot begin, as Kant had done, with an isolated individual subject 
experiencing the world and then ask how a world of experience gets built up out of the 
inner world of purely subjective experience. Rather, one must begin with an already 
shared world of subjects making judgements in the light of possible judgments by others. 
Hegel accorded central importance to recognition, linking it to desire, particularly the 
desire for desire of the other. It is through mutual recognition that individuals sustain 
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patterns of entitlements and commitments, the social, and it is in the social that the 
knowing subject, mind, emerges. Hegel emphasised the historical specificity of human 
self-conceptions upon which society is founded. Person and subject are given content 
only by the social institutions in which each individual achieves social identity through 
interdependence and mutual recognition. So, for Hegel, mind or consciousness is 
manifested in social institutions, that is, ways of life, which give identities, self concepts, 
to individuals. Here, then, the “one” and the “many” are neither dichotomies nor dualisms 
/ dualities, but poles of a paradox which are transformed into both individual identity / 
consciousness and social relations at the same time. It is in this tradition that Mead argues 
that mind, self and society arise together at the same time and Elias argues that the 
individual is the singular and the social is the plural of interdependent people. 
 
 
What is an organisation? 
 
If one takes this paradoxical, dialectical perspective, then how does one think about the 
nature of a group, organisation or society? Mead (1934) explains the simultaneous 
emergence of mind and society in terms of the social act in which one gestures to another 
and in so doing calls forth a response from that other. Gesture and response are 
inseparable phases in one act which constitutes meaning. Here meaning does not lie in 
the gesture alone because the meaning of the gesture cannot be known until there is a 
response. If one person shouts this means aggression if the other responds with an angry 
shout but it could mean a warning if the other takes evading action. Consciousness arises 
when the one making a gesture calls forth in herself a similar response to that called forth 
in the one to whom she is gesturing. She can then know what she is doing. Mead calls 
this social act a significant symbol. A conversation of gestures in significant symbols 
make possible far more sophisticated forms of cooperation, of society, because those 
interacting can know what they are doing and signal to others what they intend. Mead 
points to the particular importance of the vocal form significant symbol, namely 
language, in human interaction. Mind is arising at the same time as human social 
interaction is arising on the conversation of significant symbols. Mind takes the form of a 
private role play / silent conversation of the gesturer and of the responder. Mind is the 
process of an individual body gesturing and responding to itself at the same time as it is 
gesturing and responding to others, the social. Mind and society are therefore simply 
different aspects of the same processes of communicative interaction in which meaning is 
arising. Interdependent individuals are interacting with each other in a way in which they 
are taking the attitudes of others, of the group and of society as a whole, to their gestures. 
They are also interacting in a way in which they are taking the attitude of the group or 
society to themselves. As subjects (the “I”) they are taking themselves as objects (the 
“me” or attitude of the society to the “I”) and it is in this process that self-consciousness 
arises. 
 
What Mead is explaining here are processes of communicative interaction that constitute 
both mind and society at the same time. They are simultaneously forming and being 
formed by each other at the same time. One is not at a different level to another and it 
makes no sense to think of one inside the other. Instead of thinking in terms of spatial 
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metaphors, of levels and inside-outside, Mead’s explanation focuses our attention on how 
the actions of human bodies are creating patterns of meaning in their iterated interaction 
with each other. As people interact, coherent patterns of meaning, of knowledge, are 
perpetually iterated. These continually emerging patterns take thematic forms, both 
narrative and propositional, both conscious and unconscious, and they organise the 
experience of being together. Such themes are iterated in the repetitive form of habit but 
always with the potential for transformation. Such patterns are patterning themselves in 
the local interaction between people, a point to be explained later in relation to 
complexity theory. The result is a way of thinking about human action that moves away 
from the dual rationalist-formative causality referred to above to a transformative 
causality (Stacey, Griffin & Shaw, 2000). 
 
This is a key aspect of what colleagues and I have called complex responsive processes. 
Organisations are patterns of communicative interaction between interdependent 
individuals. Another key aspect of complex responsive processes of human relating is to 
be found in the work of Elias (2000). 
 
For Elias, all human relating imposes constraints on those relating, while at the same time 
enabling those relating to do what they could not otherwise have done. This is, of course, 
what power means – power is enabling constraints between people. Instead of thinking of 
power as the possession of some and not of others, Elias understands power as a 
characteristic of, a pattern in, all human relating. In human relating some are more 
constrained than others so establishing a figuration of power relations in which the 
distribution of power is not equal. As they interact, the power relations, the pattern of 
enabling constraints, emerges, shifts and evolves. Elias describes in some detail how 
ideologies unconsciously sustain figurations of power relations. He also connects 
emerging and iterated patterns of power relations with identity. Power figurations operate 
to include some people in a group and exclude others in the interest of sustaining power 
relations and in the course of doing this, powerful group identities are created. Elias calls 
these “we” identities and shows how inextricably linked such “we” identities are to each 
individual’s “I” identity. 
 
These closely connected aspects of power relations, ideology and identity are also key 
aspects of complex responsive processes of relating between human bodies. 
Organisations are patterns of power relations sustained by ideological themes of 
communicative interaction and patterns of inclusion and exclusion in which human 
identities emerge. There is yet another key element in the theory of complex responsive 
processes. This is provided by analogies drawn from particular kinds of computer 
simulation to be found in what has come to be called the sciences of complexity. The 
simulations model the dynamics of iterated, nonlinear interaction between entities. These 
simulations) reveal some abstract properties of interaction between digital symbols. An 
agent in the simulations is an algorithm, that is, a string of digital symbols. When these 
agents are sufficiently different to each other and when they are sufficiently connected to 
each other, then the simulations display the capacity to evolve in novel, unpredictable 
ways (for example, see Allen, 1998a, 1998b; Ray, 1992; Kauffman, 1995). What the 
simulations are demonstrating is that it is quite possible that widespread, coherent pattern 
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will emerge from the local interaction between agents. Widespread coherent, evolving 
patterns emerge from local interaction in the complete absence of an overall blueprint 
plan or programme. This process is termed self-organisation, which can be understood as 
interaction patterning itself from within, as it were. When the interacting agents are 
different enough from each other, then nonlinear iteration can amplify these differences 
into novel widespread pattern. The pattern of interaction here is transforming itself from 
within. These properties provide an abstract analogy for human interaction if translated 
into the human domain using suitable theories of psychology and sociology to provide 
the attributes of being human. 
 
A key aspect of complex responsive process of human relating is their self-organising 
emergent nature in which communicative interaction and power relating patterns itself. 
The causality is transformative and there is nothing above or below interaction itself that 
is causing the coherent patterning. Organisations are then self-organising patterns of 
communicative interacting and power relating between human bodies in the living 
present. In the living present, individuals are interacting with each other in their own 
local situations. The basis of their action is their current expectations of the future, 
conditioned by their accounts of the past, where those accounts of the past are influencing 
expectations for the future and expectations of the future are influencing the current 
accounts of the past. This view of organisation focuses attention on the way in which 
ordinary everyday conversations between people are perpetually creating the future, in 
the present, in the form of shifting patterns of communication and power relations. What 
is being perpetually created is nothing other than inseparable individual and collective 
identities. Organisations are then self-organising patterns of conversation, of meaning,  in 
which human identities emerge. 
 
To summarise, the argument presented in this section leads to the conclusion that an 
organisation is the thematically patterned activities of interdependent people, which 
constitute their closely interconnected individual and collective identities.  
 
 
Complex responsive processes of learning 
 
If one takes the view presented above on the nature of an organisation as the organising 
activities of interdependent people, it leads to a particular perspective on learning. Much 
of the communicative and power relating activities of interdependent people take the 
form of continually iterated patterns of repetition in which meaning and power 
figurations have the quality of stability which we call identity. But because of the 
nonlinear iterative nature of human interaction there is always the potential for small 
differences to be amplified into transformative shifts in identity. Learning is then 
understood as the emerging shifts in the patterning of human communicative interaction 
and power relating. Learning is emerging shifts in the thematic patterning of human 
action. Another way of saying this is to say that learning is the emerging transformation 
of inseparable individual and collective identities. Learning occurs as shifts in meaning 
and it is simultaneously individual and social. Leaning is the activity of interdependent 
people and can only be understood in terms of self organising communicative interaction 
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and power relating in which identities are potentially transformed. Individuals cannot 
learn in isolation and organisations can never learn.  
 
The immediate implication of such a view of the nature of learning is that it will 
inevitably give rise to anxiety. This is because the experience of challenges to, and shifts 
in one’s individual-collective identities are existentially threatening. It becomes important 
then to pay particular attention to how people respond to anxiety because defensive ways 
of dealing with anxiety inevitably close down learning processes. Also of great 
importance is that transformative learning involves moving into the unknown. People 
cannot know in advance what patterns of identity they are moving to and moving into the 
unknown in this way can easily be seen by others to be incompetence. In a social order 
that greatly prizes competence, understood as knowing, it is deeply shaming not to know. 
The social process of shame (Aram, 2001) is thus inextricably involved in learning 
processes and it becomes important to understand how people respond to the potential for 
shame. 
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